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WILLS-IMPLIED GIFTS OF REMAINDERS
The desire of courts to effectuate the intent of the testator is
the main objective in the construction of wills. However, certain
ambiguous phrases frequently recur which do not clearly indicate
this intent. As a result, courts have developed rules of construction
to aid in interpreting such phrases. These rules must not, however,
be used to supplant the testator's intent. That intent is always
controlling unless contrary to a positive rule of law.1 There is a
conflict implicit between the desire to give words settled meanings
through the use of rules of construction and the desire to give words
the effect intended by each individual testator. The meaning of a
given word or phrase may be apparent when standing alone, but
in the context of a particular will it may assume a meaning quite
distinct from its usual legal definition.2
"To A for life and if A dies without issue to B" is such a
phrase. On its face it is an inadequate devise of the testator's
property. No provision is made for the possibility that A will die
with issue surviving him. The words, however, do not stand alone.
They are placed in a will written for one very obvious purpose-to
devise the testator's property. The court must, therefore, decide
whether the phrase raises a sufficient implication of an intent on
the part of the testator to devise a remainder to the surviving
children of the life tenant. If the remainder is implied, a division
among the life tenant's surviving children is easily accomplished.
The beneficiaries are determined at the point of distribution of the
property-the death of the life tenant. If no remainder is implied,
the division of the property may be more difficult. This construc-
tion would leave the devise without effect at the death of the life
tenant with surviving children. The property would, therefore,
pass either to a residuary legatee or to the testator's next of kin by
intestacy. The testator's death may have preceded the death of the
life tenant by a considerable period. Under these circumstances,
it may be difficult to determine the testator's heirs, their location,
and the amount of their individual interests. This situation may
'Wheeling Dollar Says. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 709, 37 S.E,2d
563, 567 (1946).
'In Stephenson v. Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 617, 49 S.E.2d 235, 244 (1948), the
court, in discussing the testator's use of the word "heirs," noted:
It may be said that our holding runs counter to the general rule and
presumption that the word "heirs" is ordinarily used in the technical
sense. We agree that this is the rule, but the presumption may be repelled
by a plain implication of intention to use it in a different sense.
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cause delay in division of the property and the final settlement of
the estate.
Any decision that children who might survive the life tenant
have a contingent remainder interest in the property must be
based on acceptance of the doctrine of gift by implication. This
doctrine is not new. It has long been a part of the English common
law.3 The applicability of the doctrine in England, however, is
subject to a strict standard of proof first enunciated by Lord Chan-
cellor Eldon in 1812: "[In construing a Will conjecture must not
be taken for Implication: but necessary Implication means, not
natural Necessity, but so strong a Probability of Intention, that an
Intention contrary to that which is imputed to the Testator, cannot
be supposed."4 Courts in the United States have often cited this
rule, but in so doing, some have criticized it as too restrictive. In
this country, a substantial number of courts now use the doctrine
more liberally than a narrow interpretation of Lord Eldon's rule
would allow.5
32 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 381 (Lewis ed.
1902), indicates approval.of the use of implication to effectuate the testator's intent:
[A] devise [should] be most favorably expounded, to pursue if possible
the will of the devisor, who for want of advice or learning may have
omitted the legal or proper phrases. And therefore many times the law
dispenses with the want of words in devises that are absolutely requisite
in all other instruments. Thus, a fee may be conveyed without words of
inheritance; and an estate-tail without words of procreation. By a will
also an estate may pass by mere implication, without any express words
to direct its course.
'Wilkinson v. Adam, 35 Eng. Rep. 163, 180 (Ch. 1812).
51n In re Klein's Estate, 36 N.J. Super. 407, 419-20, 116 A.2d 53, 60-61 (1955)
(concurring opinion), Judge Clapp commented on the continuing viability of Lord
Eldon's rule:
The critical question in this case, as above stated, is what should be
the standard of proof here. I think Lord Eldon's rule and the rule calling
for clarity are too strongly stated. In my view the criterion should be
simply probability; a provision should be implied if we are of the opinion
that in all probability the testator actually intended that very provision.
Such a stapdard produces a far more just result, than if we were to refuse
to make any implication at all. We extend our efforts, as we thought,
toward effectuating the testator's intentions. But-and this is the heart
of the matter-the result reached does not, I think, do any violence to the
overriding policies of the Statute of Wills which require the testator's
intentions to be integrated into the paper propounded. For we derive a
probability as to his designs from the very words of the paper.
The English cases seem to be opposed to these views. But it will be
found upon an examination of the facts presented by cases in this country
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The English courts still follow Lord Eldon's rule closely. De-
spite one early case to the contrary,' this has resulted in the settled
rule in England that the phrase "to A for life and if A dies without
issue to B" does not imply a contingent remainder in A's surviving
children.7 The courts recognize that the testator probably intended
to make such a gift.8 The words themselves, however, do not fore-
close the "bare possibility" that the testator had a contrary intent.?
At least one early English authority discussed the possibility of
applying the doctrine of gift by implication in this situation. Jar-
man, in A Treatise on Wills, concluded that the application would
be "convenient" and that it would avoid a "palpable absurdity."
The author noted, however, that there was no authority for such a
construction.' 0 The English courts thus chose to follow stare decisis
despite the greater convenience in using the doctrine of gift by
implication and the probability that the gift over to the life ten-
ant's surviving children was, in fact, intended by the testator.
A substantial minority of United States' jurisdictions cling to
the English view." Bond v. Moore, an Illinois decision based
'One early English decision implied a gift to the children of a life tenant. Ex
parte Rogers, 56 Eng. Rep. 400 (V.C. 1816). This case was later expressly overruled.
Neighbour v. Thurlow, 54 Eng. Rep. 278 (Rolls 1860).
7Scale v. Rawlins, [18921 A.C. 342, affirming In re Rawlins' Trusts, 45 Ch. D.
299 (1890); Re Hayton's Trusts, 10 L.T.R. (n.s.) 336 (1864); Neighbour v. Thurlow,
54 Eng. Rep. 278 (Rolls 1860); Sparks v. Restal, 53 Eng. Rep. 341 (Rolls 1857);
Ranelagh v. Ranelagh, 50 Eng. Rep. 1036 (Rolls 1849); Greene v. Ward, 38 Eng.
Rep. 102 (Rolls 1826).
"Ranelagh v. Ranelagh, 50 Eng. Rep. 1036 (Rolls 1849), is one example of the
hesitancy of English courts to find gifts by implication. The testator bequeathed
personal property to a number of people for their respective lives, and "[i]n case
of the demise of any of the above parties without legitimate issue, their, his, or her
proportions to be divided equally amongst the survivors." The court refused to find
a gift by implication to surviving issue:
I think it extremely probable that the testator did mean a benefit to the
children, but si voluit non dixit. [Roughly translated: "He may have
intended so, but he did not say so." I think that there is not sufficient
[evidence of that intention] to raise the implication, and that the legacy
falls into the residue.
Id. at 1038.
'"[Tihe bare possibility that the testator may have purposely excluded the
omitted issue would alone be sufficient to prevent me from inserting in the will
estates which the testator has in fact omitted." Monypenny v. Dering, 68 Eng. Rep.
236, 243-44 (V.C. 1850).
"1 T. JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 674 (6th ed. 1910).
"Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576, 86 N.E. 386 (1908); Harvey v. Clayton, 206 Iowa
187, 220 N.W. 25 (1928); Bell v. Dukes, 158 Miss. 563, 130 So. 734 (1934) (But see
Ball v. Phelan, 94 Miss. 293, 49 So. 956 (1909)); Hunter v. Miller, 109 Neb. 219,
3
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largely on the precedent set by the English cases, is an example of
a carefully considered opinion adopting the English rule. 2 The
case is also an example of the kind of bizarre result that can occur
when a court is so determined to preserve technical and historical
consistency that it disregards the probable intent of the testator.
In Bond, the testatrix devised a life estate in certain land to
her son. The life tenant was given the power to sell the real estate
and the right to use the proceeds necessary to meet his reasonable
expenses. At the son's death the property was to pass as follows:
"[B]ut should he die without children, then the estate, or so much
of it as may remain .. shall go to my nearest relatives ..
The court determined that the will devised a contingent remainder
to the nearest relatives of the testatrix.alive at the life tenant's
death'. The principal problem, however, was whether the will de-
vised a vested remainder to the'children of the life tenant subject
to divestment if they predeceased him,* or whether it devised a
reversion to.the heirs of the testatrix if the life tenant died with
issue surviving. The testatrix' son sought to convey a fee simple
interest in the property by application of the doctrine of merger.
He contended that as the life tenant and the owner of a reversion-
ary interest, which he claimed pursuant to his status as the sole
heir at law of the testatrix at her death, he could convey both
interests.to a third party, thereby destroying the contingent re-
mainder and vesting full fee simple title in the grantee. One of the
life tenant's daughters disagreed, arguing that the life tenant was
attempting to convey an interest vested in his children subject to
divestment only if they predeceased him.
The court, with three judges dissenting, found that the life
tenant could use the doctrine of merger to convey a fee simple title.
Relying heavily on the English authorities, the court refused to
imply a remainder interest in favor of the life tenant's children. To
190 N.W. 583 (1922); Monk v. Geddes, 159 S.C. 86, 156 S.E. 175 (1930); Wood v.
Wood, 132 S.C. 120, 128 S.E. 837 (1925); Addisdn v. Addison, 9 Rich. Eq. 58 (S.C.
1856); Carr v. Porter, 1 McCord, Eq. 60 (S.C. 1825).
"12236 111. 576, 86 N.E. 386 (1908). The opinion states the following minority rule:
A devise for life with a gift over on the death of the life tenant without
issue, is not, of itself sufficient to create a gift by implication to the
children of the life tenant. Such implication can only arise when sup-
ported by some other matter appearing in the will raising an inference in
favor of the children.
Id. at 588, 86 N.E. at 390. The decision in this case was reviewed with approval in
Comment, 3 ILL. L. Rav. 590 (1908).
11236 Ill. at 577, 86 N.E. at 387.
[Vol. 76
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imply such a remainder, the majority reasoned, would be to pre-
sume a will for the testatrix based on mere speculation as to her
intention." The testatrix had made no provision for the descent of
the real estate if the life tenant died with issue surviving, and the
court would not insert such a provision for her. 5 The court held
that an estate cannot be raised by implication when the will is
absolutely silent with regard to it, but must be based only on an
expression in the will giving some evidence of the testator's inten-
tion."6 In addition, the court indicated that, in the construction of
wills, a presumption against disinheritance of heirs existed and
this presumption could be rebutted only by clear words to the
contrary.' 7 Since no words in the will clearly indicated that the
testatrix did not want her son to inherit the reversionary interest
in the property, it was presumed that she intended him to inherit
it.
By refusing to imply a gift over to those children of the life
tenant who survived him, the court perverted the testatrix' most
obvious intention. The language in the will clearly indicated that
the life tenant was not to have absolute title to the property. The
court itself found an intent for the property to go to other relatives
if the life tenant died without children. The reliance placed on
English precedents and the desire to conform to those precedents
made the will ineffective as a devise of the real estate in question.
The testatrix obviously intended that the property pass according
to the will's provisions. Instead, it effectively passed in fee to her
sole heir at law. The will managed only to cause an expensive legal
controversy.
The English cases refusing to imply a remainder can no longer
be considered to represent a settled rule of construction. By a great
weight of authority in the United States, a gift over to the surviving
children of the life tenant will now be implied. "s The Restatement
"Id. at 590, 86 N.E. at 391.
IId. at 589, 86 N.E. at 391.
"Id. at 581, 86 N.E. at 388.
"Id. at 589-90, 86 N.E. at 391.
"Estate of Heard v. Bank of America, 25 Cal. 2d 322, 153 P.2d 553 (1944);
Estate of Easterday v. American Trust Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 598, 114 P.2d 669
(1941); In re Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 108 P. 287 (1910); Du Pont v. Equitable
Sec. Trust Co., 115 A.2d 482 (Del. Ch. 1955); Shepherd v. Peratino, 86 App. D.C.
395, 182 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Wetter v. United Hydraulic Cotton Press Co.,
75 Ga. 540 (1885); Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d 587 (1935); Vittitow
v. Keene, 265 Ky. 66, 95 S.W.2d 1083 (1936); Bourne v. Johns, 233 Ky. 448, 26
S.W.2d 13 (1930); Wilkins v. Miltimore, 95 N.H. 17, 56 A.2d 535 (1948); Kendall
5
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of Property contains a concise statement of the prevailing view on
construction of the phrase in question:
When property is limited by an otherwise effective convey-
ance "to B for life, and if B dies without issue, then to C," or
by other words of similar import, then, unless a contrary intent
of the conveyor is found from additional language or circum-
stances, an inference is required that the conveyor has limited
an interest in favor of the issue of B, in the event that B dies
survived by issue.'"
The argument in favor of the majority position is based upon com-
mon sense rather than technical construction." Simes and Smith,
in their treatise on future interests, approve the Restatement rule
as "the only rational explanation" for the phrase used.2 The Re-
statement and Simes and Smith both indicate that a reasonable
implication leading to a rational result is preferable to the assump-
tion that the testator failed to devise a portion of his estate.2 The
v. Kendall, 36 N.J. Eq. 91 (1882) (But note the "advisory opinion" given by the
court without citing Kendall in Daly v. Rogers, 132 N.J. Eq. 200, 27 A.2d 885
(1942)); Bishop v. Bishop, 257 N.Y. 40, 177 N.E. 302 (1931); In re Moore's Estate,
152 N.Y. 602, 46 N.E. 960 (1897); In re Brooks' Estate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sur. Ct.
1952); McRorie v. Creswell, 273 N.C. 615, 160 S.E.2d 681 (1968); West v. Murphy,
197 N.C. 488, 149 S.E. 731 (1929); Hauser v. Craft, 134 N.C. 319, 46 S.E. 756 (1904);
Keister v. Keister, 144 N.E.2d 336 (Ohio C.P. 1957) (But see Anderson v. United
Realty Co., 79 Ohio St. 23, 86 N.E. 644 (1914) and Woodlief v. Duckwall, 19 Ohio
C.C.R. 564, 10 Ohio C. Dec. 686 (1900)); Rouse Estate, 369 Pa. 568, 87 A.2d 281
(1952); Africa Estate, 359 Pa. 567, 59 A.2d 925 (1948); Cope Estate, 353 Pa. 306, 45
A.2d 52 (1946); List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 129 A. 64 (1925); Beilstein v. Beilstein,
194 Pa. 152, 45 A. 73 (1899); In re Estate of Roth, 101 Pa. Super. 443 (1930); Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Huntoon, 181 A.2d 614 (R.I. 1962); Garber v. Saufley,
131 Va. 514, 109 S.E. 306 (1921); Conrad v. Quinn, 111 Va. 607, 69 S.E. 952 (1911);
Wine v. Markwood, 31 Gratt. 337 (Va. 1878).
" 113 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 272 (1940).
In Shepherd v. Peratino, 86 App. D.C. 395, 397, 182 F.2d 384, 386 (D.C. Cir.
1950), the court, in adopting the Restatement rule, commented that the principle
of construction formulated by the Restatement was "soundly based on common
sense."
21 In the majority of cases, it would seem that the only rational ex-
planation for the gift over on death of the life tenant without children
is that the testator intended the children to take if the life tenant died
with children. Special contexts may, of course, lead a court to refuse to
imply a remainder, but in the ordinary case testamentary intent would
be effectuated by the implication.
2 L. SrMEs & A. SMrrH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 842, at 327-28 (2d ed. 1956).
12Simes and Smith point out that "[tlhe argument that the testator may have
intended the life tenant to take a reversion by intestacy is not very convincing.
Testators do not, as a rule, express their intentions in any such manner." Id. § 842,
at 328. The Restatement takes a similar position, using slightly different language:
[Vol. 76
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presumption against intestacy and the presumption against disin-
heritance should be given equal weight, with reason tipping the
scale to one side or the other. The majority of the states in this
country consider it more reasonable in this situation to find that
the testator meant to devise a remainder to the life tenant's surviv-
ing children.?
Professor Richard Powell, in his treatise on real property,24
proposes a slightly different approach from the Restatement
position. He contends that the phrase "to A for life and if A dies
without issue to B" is not sufficient evidence from which the court
may imply a remainder interest to those children of A who survive
him.? In most of the cases in which the implication has been made,
it has helped to mitigate inequality between the various groups of
the testator's descendants. Powell believes that those parties ask-
ing the court to imply the remainder should be required to show
that the implication will tend to distribute the property more
evenly among the descendants.
21
The difference between Powell's position and that of the
Restatement is one of emphasis. Powell sees the tendency to pro-
mote equality of distribution as a necessity. The Restatement
considers it a corroborative factor? The Restatement concedes
that testators normally seek to make an equal distribution28 but
contends that the rule can be validly applied when this additional
factor is not present. The Restatement rule seems preferable, since
the implication is made under this rule without a court determina-
[lin this situation . . . the intent commonly prevalent among conveyors
similarly situated . . . requires the inferring of an interest in favor of the
issue of B. The failure to make such an inference would impute to the
conveyor caprice in the disposition of his property and no such imputa-
tion is to be made when reasonably avoidable.
3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 272, at 1398 (1940).
"Discussions analyzing and quoting from many of the cases in the United
States which reach the issue of whether the phrase "to A for life and if A dies
without issue to B" implies a gift over to the surviving children of A may be found
in Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 177 (1952), and in 28 Am. JuR. 2d Estates § 202 (1966).21R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1971).
22 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 323, at 740 (rev. ed. 1971).
261d.
21"When the making of the inference of a remainder in favor of the 'issue of B,'
prevents or minimizes inequality of distribution as between two or more stirpes
related to the conveyor in the same manner, then this fact is a corroborative circum-
stance, strengthening the rule stated in this section." 3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 272, comment e, at 1400 (1940).
2jld. § 243, comment f, at 1214.
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tion that it would tend to distribute the property more evenly
among the descendants. Thus, a court proceeding can be avoided.
The trend in case law in the United States is toward the
Restatement position. 9
Fisher v. West Virginia Gas Corp.0 is the only decision by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that has passed upon the
question discussed herein. In Fisher, a dispute over rights to royal-
ties from a gas lease led to litigation over a will admitted to probate
more than fifty years before the actual controversy arose. The will
contained a clause granting certain realty to the testator's nephew
for life and, if he died without issue, to the heirs of the testator.
After the testator died, his heirs granted a quitclaim deed to the
life tenant who then quitclaimed his interest to another. The
claimants under this chain of title were the defendants in Fisher.
The plaintiffs were the heirs of the life tenant's surviving son.3'
"Of seven decisions made since 1950 dealing with the issue of whether the
remainder should be implied, three adopted the Restatement rule. Shepherd v.
Peratino, 86 App. D.C. 395, 397-98, 182 F.2d 384, 386-87 (D.C. Cir. 1950); McRorie
v. Creswell, 273 N.C. 615, 618-19, 160 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1968); Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co. v. Huntoon, 181 A.2d 614, 618 (R.I. 1962). Two cases cite the Restatement
rule with apparent approval but without specifically adopting it. DuPont v. Equita-
ble Sec. Trust Co., 115 A.2d 482, 489 (Del. Ch. 1955); Kiester v. Kiester, 144 N.E.2d
336, 349 (Ohio C.P. 1957). Two cases cite neither the Restatement rule nbr the
relevant portions of Powell's treatise. In re Brooks' Estate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sur.
Ct. 1952); Rouse's Estate, 369 Pa. 568, 87 A.2d 281 (1952). Both decisions imply a
remainder, but In re Brooks'Estate seems to adopt Powell's reasoning. In this case,
the court indicates that the implication is made because "[lit is by this construc-
tion alone that a coherent and symmetrical plan of distribution can be effected."
In re Brooks' Estate, supra at 347. Rouse's Estate, however, states the Restatement
rule without citing to the Restatement and announces that it is a "well established
canon of will construction." Rouse's Estate, supra at 571, 87 A.2d at 283.
-127 W. Va. 645, 34 S.E.2d 123 (1945).
3Id. In greater detail, the facts in Fisher are as follows: The testator, John M.
Fisher, by will dated May 14, 1877, and admitted to probate July 1, 1877, devised
a tract of land to his nephew, Charles L. Fisher, for life "and if the said C. L. Fisher
dies without bodily heirs the said land shall revert back to the heirs of John L.
Fisher." In 1878, the life tenant was granted' a deed to the property by eleven
persons claiming to be the heirs at law of the testator. In 1880, the life tenant and
his wife conveyed all of their right, title, and interest in the property to Christopher
C. Cunningham. C. Cunningham then conveyed his interest to WilliamT. Cun-
ningham by a deed whose date is not disclosed in the record. The court refused to
rule on the effect of the deed, dated in 1878 from the purported heirs of the testator,
since the deed had not been made a part of the record. The last grantee in this
chain, William T. Cunningham, died intestate in 1938. His widow and heirs at law
were named defendants in this action. Charles L. Fisher, the life tenant named in
the testator's will, also died intestate in 1938. He left one son, Ben Fisher, surviving.
Ben Fisher died intestate in 1939. His widow and heirs at law were named plaintiffs
[Vol. 76
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The court, in Fisher, decided against the implication of a re-
mainder in favor of the life tenant's surviving child. The court
recited Lord Eldon's rule on the doctrine of gift by implication.12
It also cited Bond v. Moore3: and apparently followed the reasoning
used by the Bond court. 4 The dicta in the case, coupled with the
failure to imply a remainder, indicate that West Virginia stands
among the minority of states following the English authorities.
In reaching its decision in Fisher, the West Virginia court
considered one early Virginia case, Wine v. Markwood, in which
the Virginia court implied a remainder in favor of surviving issue
of the life tenant.35 The West Virginia court did not disapprove the
holding in Wine; nor did it comment on the logic used in the
Virginia case. It simply indicated that while the Virginia court had
stated that, in the will before it, sufficient evidence existed from
which a remainder could be implied, no such sufficiency of evi-
dence could be found in the will litigated in Fisher.36 The West
Virginia court has, thus, never expressly disapproved the implica-
tion of a remainder where sufficient evidence existed to support it.
The decision in Fisher is not necessarily inconsistent with ei-
ther the Restatement rule or Powell's approach. Powell cites Fisher
in this action. Plaintiffs executed a lease authorizing West Virginia Gas Corpora-
tion to begin drilling for gas on the property in dispute. Defendants issued a similar
lease. Suit was then brought to determine who had the right to royalties derived
from the profits of the above-mentioned drilling operation.
'2Id. at 651, 34 S.E.2d at 127.
"236 Ill. 576, 86 N.E. 386 (1908).
"
tSee 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 323, at 739 n.3 (rev. ed. 1971).
331 Gratt. 337 (1878). Wine is an early example of the Virginia court's willing-
ness to imply a gift to the surviving children of the life tenant. In this case, the court
found that the gift over to others on the death of the life tenant without issue was
a sufficient expression of an intention to vest a remainder in the surviving issue of
the life tenant:
Why did the testator give the portion of his son Sampson [the life ten-
ant] to his surviving brothers only in the event of his dying without issue?
Why but because in the only other possible event, to-wit: the death, of
said son leaving issue living at such death; he intended that such issue
should have the said portion?
Id. at 339.
"We have examined the opinion in Wine v. Markwood. . . . The
Court there held that the testator's intention was sufficiently expressed
or "at least implied." In this case we do not think the intention of the
testator to devise a remainder to the heirs of the body of Charles L. Fisher
[the life tenant] is expressed or implied.
127 W. Va. at 652, 34 S.E.2d at 127.
9
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as an example of a case in which a remainder should not be im-
plied, noting that such an implication would have benefited a
grandnephew at the expense of descendants more closely related
to the testator. 7 The argument can thus be made that the court
did not imply a remainder because it presumed that the testator
wished to distribute the property as equally as possible among his
descendants. However, this is not the explanation given by the
court as the basis for its decision.
It is more reasonable to argue that Fisher is an example of a
case in which the will itself indicates that the implication should
not be made. The Restatement recognizes that the implication
should not be made when "a contrary intent of the conveyor is
found from additional language and circumstances."' The court,
in its decision, took note of just such additional language and
circumstances. It observed that immediately preceding the devise
in question was a devise of land to the testator's daughter for life,
which "at her death shall go to her bodily heirs." The testator,
therefore, knew the proper way to provide for a remainder in the
life tenant's issue; yet, he did not express his intention in like
manner with regard to his nephew and his nephew's children. The
court stated that "this is a clear indication that the testator had
no intention to devise a remainder to the heirs of the body of his
nephew."40
Despite the dicta in Fisher and the failure of the court to imply
a remainder in the life tenant's surviving children, the holding in
Fisher does not irrevocably place West Virginia among the minor-
ity of states following English case precedent.' West Virginia can,
r2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 323, at 740-41 n.7 (rev. ed. 1971).
13 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 272 (1940).
3The applicable portion of the will states that:
I give and bequeath to my daughter,.Eliza Ann Ranson, fifty acres run-
ning the same as the Stiles line which she shall hold and enjoy during
her life and at her death shall go to her bodily heirs. I give and bequeath
to Charles L. Fisher, my nephew, sixty acres of land .... He is to have
and enjoy said land during his natural life and if the said C. L. Fisher
dies without bodily heirs the said land shall revert back to the heirs of
John M. Fisher [the testator].
127 W. Va. at 647, 34 S.E.2d at 125.
1Id. at 652, 34 S.E.2d at 127.
"West Virginia has implied remainders in previous cases. The use of implica-
tion by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been limited, however, to
the situation in which it was necessary to find a cross remainder in order to effec-
tuate the court's determination of the intent of the donor. See Bank of Greenbrier
v. Effingham, 51 W. Va. 267, 41 S.E. 143 (1902) and Lazier v. Lazier, 35 W. Va.
[Vol. 76
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in a subsequent decision, adopt the more modem American major-
ity view in favor of implication without overruling Fisher. The
trend in the United States is toward adopting the Restatement rule
as the rule of construction that best promotes the testator's intent.
If a case should again arise in West Virginia in which the court is
confronted with the phrase, "to A for life and if A dies without
issue to B," the court should distinguish Fisher on its facts and
adopt the Restatement rule which would imply a remainder in
facor of the life tenant's surviving children.
W. Richard McCune, Jr.
567, 14 S.E. 148 (1891). In the early case of Graham v. Graham, 23 W. Va. 36, 42
(1883), the court used the language, also used in Fisher, of Lord Eldon in Wilkenson
v. Adam, 35 Eng. Rep. 163, 182 (Ch. 1812). However, the court also set forth a
second test more in line with the modem view: "When implications are allowed
they must be such as are highly probable, and not merely possible." (Emphasis
added). Compare this second test with Lord Eldon's rule in the text accompanying
note 4 supra.
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